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Historically, industrialization has been associated with falling relative returns to skills.
This fact is at odds with most theories of industrialization, which tend to imply rising skill
premia as natural concomitants to economic growth. This paper develops a very simple
model of historical growth to help solve this puzzle. Assuming that human capital is both a
consumption good and an investment good, the model demonstrates how rising education
levels, non-monotonic fertility rates, and falling skill premia can all be explained within one
theory.
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11 Introduction
To many, world economic history is surprisingly simple - for the last few hundred years tech-
nological progress has allowed some societies to lift themselves out of their timeworn Malthusian-
based poverty (Clark 2007). Yet while this history may be simple, the challenge to theoretically
explain it has been anything but. The diculty has been to capture the qualitative eects of
these technological changes. In particular, the accessories of today's growth are in many ways
completely dierent from those at the dawn of technological growth. Today progress is associ-
ated with a stable (or even falling) population, high rates of education, rapid income growth on
average and great income disparities within the economy. The world's rst foray into modernity
two and a half centuries ago, on the other hand, witnessed something very dierent - exploding
population, stagnant education, modest increases in average income and falling income inequal-
ity. Traditional growth theories, able to capture present-time growth, are nevertheless consistent
only with a small fragment of human history.
What to make of such disparate pictures? To extrapolate forward from the Industrial Revo-
lution would be to predict a fairly egalitarian society of 40 billion illiterate souls of very modest
means.1 To extrapolate backwards from our modern world would be to suggest an industrial
\big bang" of immediate fertility control and skill acquisition. Both exercises are misleading;
ostensible discontinuities in historical growth patterns frustrate these kinds of simple forward
and backward inductions.
This paper attempts to link both worlds by employing a very simple model of growth and
demography. Using a unied approach such as this has been the cri de coeur of Oded Galor,
who entreats growth economists to use micro-founded theories to capture the entire process of
development, not merely an episode of it (Galor 2005, 2009). This creates a formidable but
important intellectual challenge - constraining oneself to a single theory to account for the whole
process of development will arguably enhance the viability of growth theory overall.
An even greater challenge in unied growth theory is to link dierent episodes of industrializa-
tion in dierent economies. First the U.K. and then the U.S. led the world in labor productivity
from the mid-eighteenth to mid-twentieth centuries (Broadberry 1994), yet few theories can rea-
sonably capture the growth stories of both. In particular, the industrialization histories of these
and many other economies show falling relative returns to skilled labor (at least until the latter
half of the 20th century). Yet most theories of industrialization imply that rising skill premia
are the natural concomitants to economic growth and modernization (see for example Galor and
1Or so might conclude those at Scientic American, who published an article in 1976 suggesting that the earth
could support a population of 40 billion on a diet of 2,500 calories per day. Of course, the nation of Utopia in
H.G. Wells's Men Like Gods sounds like an extrapolation of this kind into the very distant future: \[the people]
spent the great gifts of science as rapidly as it got them in a mere insensate multiplication of the common life.
At one time in the Last Age of Confusion the population of Utopia had mounted to over two thousand million."
2Weil 2000; Jones 2001; Hansen and Prescott 2002; Lucas 2002). A truly unied approach should
endeavor to account for such falling relative returns to skills in these economies.
Specically, we develop an overlapping-generations model where households choose the num-
ber of their children and their levels of education. To this we add two simple and plausible
assumptions. One is that skilled and unskilled labor are grossly substitutable in production (so
that increases in either can produce large aggregate income gains). The other is that income
and human capital are grossly complementary in household utility (so that human capital can
be considered a consumption good as well as an investment good). With these assumptions,
we demonstrate how technological progress can produce the characteristics of historical growth
in one parsimonious theory - gradual increases in education, non-monotonic changes in fertility,
and declines in skill premia.
We hasten to mention that we are only studying the consequences of technological progress,
not the sources.2 Nor are we attempting to account for the timing of industrialization, or motivate
the reasons why it happened in England, and not China, India or Japan. For these reasons we
treat technological advances as exogenous.3 However, we should nevertheless investigate the deus
ex machina of both the Industrial Revolution and the Demographic Transition simultaneously,
for this can help explain some of the historical concomitants of industrialization. Do they each
arise from dierent sources, or do they result from the same underlying forces? The unied
approach that follows conjectures the latter to examine what possible forces could have shaped
the world into the one in which we currently nd ourselves.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 enumerates some of the \stylized facts"
of the rst and second industrial revolutions. Section 3 goes through the model of technology
and demography. Section 4 simulates the model to see if it can adequately capture the major
qualitative aspects highlighted in section 2. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Facts to Fit
Galor (2005) asks some of the fundamental questions that unied growth theories aim to
answer, one of the most important being \What are the underlying behavioral and technological
structures that can simultaneously account for these distinct phases of development?" In this
paper we impose a certain behavioral structure, motivated by available historical evidence, that
uniquely accounts for these phenomena. The phenomena we wish to address constitute a new
set of \stylized facts" that beg explanation by unied growth theories on industrialization in
2See however O'Rourke et al. (2008) for one such study that endogenizes technological growth in history.
3Mokyr and Voth (2006) draws from Isaiah Berlin's \The Hedgehog and the Fox" to distinguish between two
kinds of researchers - \hedgehogs" looking for a single Theory of Everything, and \foxes" looking for solutions
to smaller problems. In keeping certain things exogenous in order to explain some other large phenomena, this
paper strives to merge the grand vision of the hedgehog with the talents of the fox.
3England and other regions.
2.1 The Rise and Fall of Fertility
The rst challenge for a model of the Industrial Revolution is to account for its apparent
un-revolutionary beginnings, for personal income increases were very minor in the early stages
of industrialization. One major reason for this was the link between productivity and population
growth during the years 1750-1850 (often called the \rst Industrial Revolution"). The En-
glish population for example rose from six million in the 1740s (roughly the maximum attained
throughout the previous millennium) to twenty million by the 1860s. Most of this population
increase came from increases in fertility, as mortality declined very modestly during the rst
Industrial Revolution (falling only to where it had been during the mid-seventeenth century).
Crude birth and death rates for England are depicted in Figure 1.
The relationship between income per capita and population growth in England and much
of Western Europe however evolved non-monotonically. While the rst Industrial Revolution
witnesses a dramatic increase in birth rates along with increases in per capita incomes, this
pattern reversed during the \second Industrial Revolution" (roughly 1850-1910), where further
per capita income gains accompanied rapidly falling birth rates (see Figure 1).
For the United States, Jones and Tertilt (2006) document both the sharp fall in fertility
throughout most of the 20th century as well as the strong negative relationship between income
and fertility for all cohorts. Thus it appears that 20th century American growth continued the
late 19th century European trend of general demographic transition (see Figure 3).
2.2 The Role of Education
One of the most dicult challenges for would-be unied growth theorists is attempting to
explain education's non-role during the early stages of industrialization. While most theories of
industrialization imply that growth and skill accumulation go hand in hand,4 the rst Industrial
Revolution appears to be compatible with greater use of unskilled labor instead of skilled labor.
During this time rates of formal education and training either remained stagnant or rose very
modestly. There is much evidence of this pattern. For example, David Mitch suggests that in
key expanding sectors of the British economy, such as cotton textiles, rates of education were
declining. For the general economy, elementary school enrollment gures based on parochial
surveys between 1818 and 1833 show enrollment perfectly steady at 42 percent (Mitch 1982).
Indeed, according to Sanderson (1995), literacy rates did not increase at all through the whole
rst wave of industrialization (1750 - 1830; see Figure 2). Landes (1969) sums it up best:
\Although certain workers - supervisory and oce personnel in particular - must be able to read
4See for example Becker et al. (1990), Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Lucas (2002).
4and do the elementary arithmetical operations in order to perform their duties, a large share of
the work of industry can be performed by illiterates as indeed it was, especially in the early days
of the Industrial Revolution." In short, formal education barely rose during the heart of the rst
Industrial Revolution, the period between 1750 and 1830.
This makes the contrast between the rst and second Industrial Revolutions all the more
striking, for education grew rapidly later on. For example, Schoeld (1973) shows very sluggish
increases in signature rates at marriage from 1780 - 1830, but these subsequently skyrocket,
and England achieves near-universal literacy a mere 70 years later. And Flora et al. (1983)
documents that while only 11 percent of children aged 5-14 were enrolled in primary school in
1855, this gure explodes to 74 percent by the turn of the century (see Figure 2). Thus it appears
that education became more and more important in production only during the latter stages of
industrialization.
America's growth in the 20th century only rearms the importance of human capital in the
post mid-19th century world. Goldin (1999) documents the prominent role education played in
the U.S. economy during the 20th century (see Figure 3). At the start of the century very few
people could aord to attend school; by the end of the century very few could aord not to
attend school. This dramatic transformation in America's focus on education leads Goldin and
Katz (2007, 2008) to dub the 20th century the \human capital century." Any theory attempting
to unify the stages of growth has to account for this transformation of education's immaterial
role in the eighteenth century to its indispensability in the twentieth.
2.3 Inequality and the Skill Premium
Based on the evidence on education, one would perhaps suspect that earnings for educated
people were quite low during England's rst Industrial Revolution and at the dawn of the Amer-
ican 20th century, thus inducing families to keep their children uneducated. Only higher relative
earnings for educated children would induce parents to provide their children a formal schooling.
But the evidence suggests just the opposite - from 1700 up to the Great War, the premium on
education in England was at its peak before industrialization and modernization ever happened.
Similarly in the United States, the relative return of a high school diploma was at its peak at
the turn of the 20th century, not the 21st.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the skill premia generally fell during both of England's Industrial
Revolutions. Williamson (1982) produces a variety of skill premia for dierent classications of
workers - here we see that even when farmers are included as unskilled laborers (a group whose
wages were relatively stagnant in the rst half of the 19th century), skill premia do not reach
their 1755 highs even a century later. These gures also indicate falling premia between 1781 and
1815, right during the heart of the Industrial Revolution. Mitch (1999) rearms this, showing
that premia were either stagnant or declining during this time. And Clark (2003) illustrates that
5premia continue to fall even during the second Industrial Revolution, a time that many suggest
was when human capital played a critical role in production.
As for the United States, an extensive literature exists on the pre-Second World War wage
premium for skilled to manual workers. Almost all papers in this literature nd a compression
of the wage structure before 1950.5 Goldin and Katz (2008) suggest a general pattern of falling
premia prior to 1950, relatively stagnant premia from 1950 to 1980, and rising premia only after
1980 (see Figure 5).
Thus historically industrialization appears to be conducive to falling returns to skilled labor
relative to the returns to unskilled labor. This is also true when looking across countries at
dierent stages of industrialization (see Figure 5). There are still other sources of evidence. For
example, there is no sign that the rewards to numeracy and literacy were any higher in England
in 1800 than they were in 1200. The premium for these and other skills in the labor market
seems to have outright declined through the Industrial Revolution. There is simply no evidence
of any market signal to parents that they needed to invest more in the education or training of
their children during any part of the 19th century (Clark 2003, 2007).
A rather formidable puzzle emerges when attempting to reconcile all these pieces of industri-
alization. Although human capital is often center stage in stories of modernization, we see a very
poor match between the elements that enter into a human capital story of early industrialization:
the role of education, the average size of families, and the premium paid in the labor market for
skills. Explaining the evolution of the relative returns to skilled labor is particularly challenging.
Why does the skill premium fall with an economy's launch into sustainable economic growth?
3 A Simple Model of Industrialization
Here we oer a theoretical solution to the above-mentioned puzzles. Two general assumptions
are necessary to achieve this. First, nal output is produced both by skilled and unskilled labor.
The second is that households derive benets from both income (generated from both skilled and
unskilled labor) and human capital (generated from the education obtained by children). The
next sections make specic some of these ideas, and simulate an economy to replicate the key
features of Western industrialization.
3.1 Production
Total production in the economy combines the eorts of both unskilled and skilled labor.
These labor-types are imperfectly substitutable; thus we assume that aggregate production can
5A partial list of this literature includes Bell (1951), Keat (1960), Lebergott (1947), Ober (1948), Woytinsky
(1953), and Lindert and Williamson (1980).













where Lt, Ht, and At are respectively unskilled labor, skilled labor and the Hicks-neutral technol-
ogy level at time t. Following many labor studies on the elasticity of substitution between skilled
and unskilled labor, we will assume that  > 1, so that these factors are grossly substitutable in
aggregate production.6
Factors are paid their marginal products in competitive markets. Assuming this, we dene































Note that here relative factor payments are simply inversely related to relative factors (that
is, technology is not biased in any way towards any particular factor, so technology does not
in
uence relative factor payments).
3.2 Endogenizing Demography
Economic theory of fertility and education suggests that household demand for children and
their education will depend on family preferences, in many ways similar to preferences over
standard economic \goods." Thus the demographic choice for a society stems from the perceived
price or opportunity cost of child-rearing, and from levels of family income. The question for
theorists of unied growth is how to model stable family preferences that are consistent with the
very dierent patterns of behavior observed in history.
We will assume that agents care both about their current consumption of the nal good, and
the level of human capital of their children. We assume an over-lapping generations framework
with two stages of life - young and old. Young individuals work strictly as unskilled workers,
but also accumulate human capital. Old individuals work as both skilled and unskilled laborers,
and have children of their own. Only old individuals make decisions regarding demography.
Specically, the representative household is run by an old person who decides two things: how
many children she wishes to have (denoted nt) and the level of education each child will receive
(denoted et).
Our modeling of demography is as follows. An individual born at time t spends fraction et of
her time in school (something chosen by her parent), while devoting the rest of her time as an
6See for example Katz and Murphy (1992), Autor et al. (1998), Heckman et al. (1998), Ciconne and Peri
(2005), and Autor et al. (2007).
7unskilled laborer in the unskilled sector. At t + 1, the individual (who by this time is mature)
provides one unit of labor inelastically in the unskilled sector, and uses whatever human capital
she accumulated as a child in the skilled sector. After incurring the resource costs of child-rearing,
the adult consumes all the income she and her family have generated. After this she expires and
exits the economy.
Given this, we specify a household objective function. We assume that agents care about both
their income and their children's future level of human capital,7 and that these two things are
imperfectly substitutable.
The utility of the parent U is given by
Ut = ((Ip;t + Ic;t   Ct)
" + (1   )(ht+1)
")
1=" (4)
where Ip is the income generated by the parent, Ic is the income generated by her children, C is
the opportunity costs associated with child-rearing, and h is the average human capital endowed
to each child. These variables are functions of fertility and eduction choices made by the parent,






@et 1 > 0, @Ct
@nt > 0, @Ct
@et > 0, and
@ht+1
@et > 0. That is, increasing fertility will
raise the income produced by children and raise the costs of child-rearing; increasing education
on the other hand will raise bequests of human capital to children and raise the costs of child-
rearing yet at the same will lower income from children (essentially pulling children out of work
and into school).
Thus we are treating human capital as both an investment good (as adults rely on their ed-
ucation to generate greater returns to their labor) and a consumption good (as families derive
benets from educated children unrelated to family income). Goldin (1999) summarizes the
complex nature of education this way: \Education directly enhances productivity, and thus the
incomes of those who receive schooling, by providing individuals with useful skills....Schooling
is also a pure consumption good, enabling people to better understand and enjoy their sur-
roundings." The approach taken here is simple enough to be incorporated tractably into an
inter-generational setup, yet still able to highlight this multi-dimensional nature of education.
The parent will maximize this expression with respect to fertility and education. The rst







7Utility based on the education of children need not solely be motivated by altruism. For example, educated
children may produce a pleasant and stimulating living environment, or may produce a source of retirement
income. Acemoglu, in his recent book Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, would call this an example of
\impure altruism," or \warm glow preferences." \Warm glow preferences assume that parents derive utility not
from the future utility of their ospring, but from some characteristic of their ospring." (Acemoglu 2008, pg
840).
8This states that the marginal cost of an additional child (in the form of higher child-rearing
costs) must equal the marginal benet of an additional child (in the form of greater unskilled-
labor income). Note that because fertility is only in the rst term of equation (4), the rst order
condition for fertility is simple and takes no account of education levels.
















The left hand side is the marginal cost of education. This cost arises from two sources - increasing
the level of education per child raises the opportunity cost of child-rearing (@C
@e ) and lowers the
income generated from unskilled-child labor (@Ic
@e , which is negative). The right hand side is the
marginal benet of education. Education raises the level of human capital per child, which is a
positive input in the parent's welfare function. Notice however that these gains from education





- which captures the importance of balance between
total income and average human capital per child. The greater is net household income relative
to human capital per child, the greater are the marginal benets from additional education. The
exponent 1   " magnies this eect - the smaller is " (that is, the more complementary are net
income and human capital per child), the greater are the net benets from education when net
income is large relative to human capital. Indeed, these income-human capital complementar-
ities will be a key feature that drives human capital accumulation throughout the Industrial
Revolution.
Finally, income levels change with wage changes. These wage shocks arise from technological
developments and are exogenous to the family planner.
In order to simulate the economy we will need to explicitly state how the variables in the
welfare function (Ip;t, Ic;t ,Ct , and ht+1) are functions of both control variables (nt and et) and
current wages (wl;t and wh;t). We specify the following simple forms:
Ip;t = wl;t + wh;tht (7)




t (1 + et)

 (9)
Lt = popt + nt (1   et)popt (10)
Ht = htpopt = e

t 1popt (11)
9popt+1 = ntpopt (12)
where 0 <  < 1, 
 > 1 and pop is the adult population. (7) - (9) respectively depict the
unskilled and skilled income generated by the parent, the unskilled income generated by chil-
dren, and forgone skilled income due to child rearing. (10) and (11) illustrate how fertility and
education translate into unskilled and skilled factors of production (note that L includes both
adults and children, while H includes only adults). Here we have a simple production function
for human capital that increases in education but experiences diminishing returns, and costs of
child rearing (in the form of foregone skilled income for the parent) that rise in both fertility and
education. Further, notice that (8) captures our fertility-education tradeo mentioned above -
more education, while increasing ht+1, will necessarily decrease Ic;t. So long as these relationships
are true our results will hold, so the qualitative conclusions we get will not be sensitive to the
precise forms or parameter values in (7) - (11). Finally, (12) shows the law of motion of the adult
population, dictated by the fertility rate.
4 Simulating the Past
4.1 Static Equilibrium - Before the Industrial Revolution
In order to simulate the economy we must rst establish the appropriate initial conditions.
Here we will treat the onset of industrialization as the moment when technological growth be-
comes positive. Thus we treat our pre-industrial economy as a purely static one, where technology
coecient A is xed at some pre-determined level. This is of course not an entirely accurate
depiction of pre-industrial society, as technologies glacially improved for millennia prior to indus-
trialization. The fact that technological growth was much slower before the Industrial Revolution
is what is important, however, and hence we lose nothing in assuming the extreme case of zero
growth as our starting point.
Beyond this, the static equilibrium requires a stable demographic structure. The conditions
necessary for this are: nt = 1, and et = et 1 at some very small level. That is, the typical
dynasty simply reproduces itself, and parents and children have the same low education levels.
The four equations we must satisfy are the rst order conditions on production (2) and (3), and
the rst order conditions on utility (5) and (6). To obtain the static equilibrium, we set nt = 1
and et = et 1 = 0:0001, and solve for wl;t, wh;t, At, and  for t = 1, setting all other parameters
equal to plausible values.8
8These are  = 2,  = 0.5, " = -10,  = 2,  = 0.5, 
 = 2. Note that the key parameters here are those that
aect the substitutability of skilled and unskilled labor in production () and the substitutability of income and
human capital in utility ("). While values of " are purely speculative, much work has been done to estimate .
The literature tends to value this somewhere between 1 and 2.5 for contemporary labor markets (see Katz and
10Our specic functional forms will allow such a solution; this constitutes our static equilibrium.9
With these values as our initial condition, all remains static - as households have no incentive to
change demographic behavior given current wages, L and H, and thus wages themselves, remain
xed. That is, until technologies begin to improve.
4.2 Dynamic Equilibria - the Industrial Revolution and the Demo-
graphic Transition with Exogenous Technological Growth
Here we run the simulation for 50 time periods to roughly capture economic and demographic
trends for our hypothetical industrializing economy. Each time period we grow A exogenously
by 2 percent and pop by the rate nt 1, and solve the system of equations (2), (3), (5) and (6) for
wl;t, wh;t, nt and et.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the results of the simulation. At the moment of technological growth,
the population is stable, education is extremely low and the skill premium is quite large. With
early productivity increases, fertility rises and education rises very slightly as well. How is this
possible in the context of a quality-quantity model of demography? Given (11) and the fact





@e = 0). Thus if early rates of education are \small enough," human
capital will rise even with very small increases in education. Households can then raise the human
capital of their ospring as their income rises. But because it does not cost them a lot to do this,
they can also aord to have more children (to take advantage of increases in the unskilled wage).
Throughout this process the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor rises, allowing the skill premium
to continually fall.
Note that Galor (2005) labels this period the \post-Malthusian" era; this is because produc-
tivity increases still translate into population increases. This is precisely what we show here.
Even though education is explicitly modeled as a normal good, increases in productivity creates
a lot of fertility with only minuscule increases in education. Income per capita growth is very
modest as a result of population growth. Thus early growth dynamics appear to be dictated by
a classic \Malthusian trap."
As exogenous technological progress continues, however, there is an endogenous transition
where further increases in productivity result in less fertility and more education. Why does the
switch occur? Once education reaches some critical level, diminishing returns to further education
are such that these increases become quite expensive. Households are willing to pay this expense
as their incomes rise further. But to lower the overall expense for education they have fewer and
Autor 1999 for a review of this literature). We also run a variety of other simulations with alternative parameter
values (not illustrated). In general our qualitative results remain consistent so long as  > 1, " < 0, and 
 > 1.
9We get initial values of   0:1, A1  0:05, wl;1  0:07, wh;1  0:17, L1  2, and H1  0:3. Note that the
parameter  is then held xed at its original value, while all other variables evolve with technological progress.
11fewer children. So households become less reliant on the unskilled income generated by their
ospring, and more reliant on their own income. This is in essence the transition to modernity;
a classic quantity/quality tradeo of child rearing emerges. And as the demographic transition
proceeds, income per capita begins to grow faster than overall GDP.10
The simulation stresses that in order to truly unify the stages of economic growth, models must
account for constant injections of skilled labor over time. An implicit result of important unied
theories such as Galor and Weil (2000), and Galor and Mountford (2006, 2008) is that transition
to modern growth is associated with rising relative returns to skilled labor (Voth 2003). But we
know this did not happen - skill premia at best remained stagnant. Galor (2005) acknowledges
the role of supply of human capital in explaining low skill premia, but must rely on exogenous
injections of skilled labor (such as those from compulsory schooling laws enacted in the late 19th
century). But one might suggest that these so-called exogenous shocks did not come randomly,
but rather were the results of political pressures both from industry (who increasingly saw the
importance of a skilled work force to exploit productivity improvements, discussed in Galor and
Moav 2006) and from households (who saw the \value" of educated children in increasing the
well-being of the family, discussed in Horrell and Humphries 1995). These were changes in the
economic incentives for education that arguably should be endogenous in any model of unied
growth.
5 Conclusion
Explaining the non-monotonic evolution of fertility, initial stagnation and subsequent growth
of education, and fall in relative returns to skilled labor in the Industrial Revolution has con-
stituted one of the major puzzles of economic history. Here we have oered an hypothesis to
explain the evolution of these variables, suggesting that the substitutability between skilled and
unskilled labor and the familial preferences for educated children must play pivotal roles in the
explanation.
Arguably human history is more challenging to explain than natural history, partly because
the data for humans can be scanty, and partly because humans are far less regular in their
behavior than natural phenomena. But the approach of the natural historian, to pre-suppose
some consistent \laws" of behavior to explain historical events, can serve the growth theorist
who is bent on unifying the history of industrialization. The theorist, playing God by setting up
the initial laws of behavior, should cease playing God once the model is under way, and discipline
him or herself by not arbitrarily changing preferences or exogenously shocking things to t facts.
The aim of the unied growth theorist is precisely that - to understand the connections between
10Indeed, population declines are so dramatic that total GDP ultimately falls. Of course in reality immigration
would likely occur with such wage increases, thus keeping total population from outright falling.
12technological progress, the formation of human capital and demographic change by creating a
faux universe and letting it run its course. It is a challenging task, and the temptation to
intervene is strong. But hopefully by \endogenizing" certain variables, the faux worlds we create
can aid the empiricists who are uncovering facts from the real one.
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